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The South Carolina Supreme Court has often stated that the dam-
ages recoverable for statutory wrongful death' include "loss of com-
panionship, and deprivation of the use and comfort of the intestate's
society." 2 Damages for personal injury short of death, however, have
traditionally been more restricted. The common law rule provided the
husband a right of action for loss of consortium with his wife but did
not provide the wife with a similar right.3 Section 10-2593 of the 1962
South Carolina Code,4 as enacted June 25, 1969, remedied this inequity
by giving a statutory right to either spouse to maintain an action for
damages "arising from an intentional or tortious violation of the right
to the companionship, aid, society and services of his or her spouse."
Thus the question posed in Green v. Southern Railway Co.' was
whether a widow could bring an action for loss of consortium under
this statute independent of the Wrongful Death Act. The United States
District Court for South Carolina held that recovery under the Wrong-
ful Death Act was the widow's exclusive remedy, thereby limiting the
applicability of code section 10-2593:
The obvious purpose of this statute is to extend to the wire the
right to recover for loss of companionship, et cetera, of her hus-
band which right existed in favor of the husband only under com-
mon law. There is no indication in the statute of an intent to go
I. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (1962) provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect
or default of another. . . .the person who would have been liable, if death
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding
the death of the person injured ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1952 (1962) provides:
Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife or husband and child
or children of the person whose death shall have been so caused ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1954 (1962) provides:
In every such action the jury may give such damages . . . as they may
think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties
respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be
brought ...
2. Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 225, 62 S.E.2d 297, 303 (1950); see, e.g..
Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 626 (D.S.C. 1967); Hardy v. United States,
187 F. Supp. 756, 762 (D.S.C. 1960).
3. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 92 (1935). Until 1969
South Carolina followed this common law rule. Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d
570 (1962). See also 9 S.C.L.Q. 491 (1957).
4. S.C. Code Ann. § 10-2593 (Supp. 1970).
5. 319 F. Supp. 919 (D.S.C. 1970).
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further than the common law and allow each spouse a right to
recover for the wrongful death of the other spouse under this
statute as well as under the Wrongful Death Act. Especially is this
true since a complete remedy for the wrongful death already exists
by virtue of the Wrongful Death Act.6
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Gilbert v. Duke Power Co. 7 the South Carolina Supreme Court
rejuvenated two aging decisions8 which permitted the admission of
certain evidence in mitigation of punitive damages. From the Gilbert
opinion, the deducible facts are that Gilbert's mother tendered payment
of his power bill to the appellant, Duke Power Company. Because of
a mistake of fact, Duke Power refused to accept payment and on the
same day discontinued electrical service to Gilbert's house. Gilbert
brought an action for wrongful termination of his electrical service and
the jury returned a verdict in his favor for an unspecified amount of
actual and punitive damages. The supreme court reversed and remand-
ed, finding error in the trial court's refusal to permit the appellant's
attorney to cross examine the respondent in regard to seven other
occasions when his electrical service had been terminated as a result of
non-payment. Thus the court held that "the proffered testimony was
relevant on the question of willfulness and could be properly considered
in the assessment of punitive damages." 9
The significance of Mastropole v. Transit Homes, Inc.'0 lies pri-
marily in the disproportionate relationship of actual damages awarded
to punitive damages awarded." In this case, the plaintiffs, owners of a
mobile home, sued the defendant, a common carrier, for damages to
their home resulting from negligent inspection and transportation. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the Mastropoles for $5,103.00 actual
damages and $45,000.00 punitive damages. The supreme court refused
6. Id. at 920.
7. 255 S.C. 495, 179 S.E.2d 720 (1971).
8. Westbrook v. Jefferies, 173 S.C. 178, 175 S.E. 433 (1934); Gwynn v. Citizens'
Telephone Co., 69 S.C. 434,48 S.E. 460 (1904).
9. 255 S.C. at 502, 179 S.E.2d at 724.
10. 254 S.C. 332, 175 S.E.2d 465 (1970).
11. It should be noted that there is no definite mathematical rule as to the propor-
tion which punitive damages should bear to actual damages. Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C.
429, 436, 144 S.E.2d 151, 154 (1965). However, it is generally held that punitive damages
must bear some reasonable relation to the injury inflicted and the cause thereof. 22 ANI.
JUR. 2d Damages § 266 (1965).
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to consider the excessiveness of the verdict for punitive damages be-
cause of the failure of appellant's counsel to argue the issue in his brief.
The court further spurned review of the actions of the trial judge in
submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury and in refusing to
grant judgment non obstante veredicto as to punitive damages because
of the failure of appellant's counsel to make timely motions during the
trial for withdrawal or for a directed verdict.
Ill. FRAUD AND DECEIT
In Carter v. Boyd Construction Co.,'2 the plaintiff, Carter, a sub-
contractor for Boyd, sustained a finger injury while on the job and filed
a claim against St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Boyd's Work-
men's Compensation carrier. St. Paul denied liability on the grounds
that Carter was a subcontractor rather than an hourly employee. Ac-
tually Carter was at one time an hourly wage employee of Boyd, but
his status was subsequently changed to that of a subcontractor. Prem-
iums for Workmen's Compensation insurance, however, continued to
be regularly deducted from Carter's pay by Boyd and then paid to St.
Paul. Some time after this change of status, Carter questioned whether
or not he was fully protected by Workmen's Compensation benefits,
but was assured by Boyd that he was protected. Boyd then contacted
the State Agent for St. Paul concerning the same question and was
assured in writing that as long as St. Paul was collecting a premium
for Carter, he would be considered an employee. Upon denial of liabil-
ity by St. Paul, Carter sued both Boyd and St. Paul for actual and
punitive damages for fraud and deceit and, in the course of the trial,
the court granted a non-suit as to Boyd and the jury returned a verdict
for $3,000.00 actual damages against St. Paul. The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed and remanded in an elucidative opinion dis-
cussing in part what it "deem[ed] to be the correct principles of law
applicable to damages in the instant case."'" Apparently South Caro-
lina follows the general rule that restricts recovery for fraud to such
damages which are the natural and proximate consequences of the
fraud." Thus, as to actual damages, the court concluded that:
Certainly Carter's injury and lost time, doctor's bills, permanent
injury, etc. did not result directly, naturally or proximately from
12. 255 S.C. 274, 178 S.E.2d 536 (1971).
13. Id. at 282, 178 S.E.2d at 540.
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any fraud on the part of St. Paul. Should the jury conclude from
the evidence that but for fraud on the part of St. Paul the employ-
ment status of Carter would have been changed so that he would
have been entitled to Workmen's Compensation benefits at the
time of his injury, then it would seem to logically follow that the
measure of actual damages would be the amount of benefits which
he would have been entitled to on his Workmen's Compensation
claim.' *
In regard to punitive damages for fraud and deceit, the court did not
discount the possibility that they might be warranted on retrial, but
cautioned that the tortfeasor must have known the representation to
have been false or have made the representation in such a reckless
manner as to be charged with consciousness of his wrongdoing. 6
IV. PERSONAL INJURY
A. Amendment to Elements of Damage
Section 10-692 of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina 17 has
repeatedly been liberally construed in favor of amendments to plead-
ings.' In fact, recent cases have stated that "the court's power of
amendment to pleadings is so large that its exercise will rarely be
disturbed."' 9 Thus the decision in Anders v. Nash20 affirming allow-
ance by the trial judge of amendment to the elements of damage is not
surprising. In that case the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by an
auto driven by the defendant, Nash. After the jury was drawn, counsel
for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint 2' in order to specifically
15. 255 S.C. at 282-83, 178 S.E.2d at 540.
16. Id.
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-692 (1962) provides:
The court may, before or after judgment, in furtherance of justice and on
such terms as may be proper, amend any pleading, process or proceeding
by. . .(c) inserting other allegations material to the case ....
18. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. Poole, 247 S.C. 425, 147 S.E.2d 692 (1966); Bank for
Say. & Trusts v. Towe, 231 S.C. 268,98 S.E.2d 539 (1957).
19. Kirven v. Lawrence, 244 S.C. 572, 578, 137 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1964); accord,
Lipscomb v. Poole, 247 S.C. 425, 147 S.E.2d 692 (1966); Hicks v. Giles, 241 S.C. 129,
127 S.E.2d 196 (1962).
20. 180 S.E.2d 878 (S.C. 1971).
21. The pertinent portions of the plaintiff's original complaint were:
3. As a result of being struck by the automobile, the plaintiff was hospital-
ized for an extensive period of time and was treated by several physicians.
Among others her injuries consisted of a fracture of the pelvis, fracture and
dislocature of the right shoulder, cerebral concussion and multiple bruises
and abrasions. One or more of these injuries have rendered the plaintiff
19711
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allege mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, and disfigurement
as elements of damage. Over objection by the defendant, the trial judge
granted the motion as to mental anguish and disfigurement, but refused
the motion as to embarrassment and humiliation. On appeal the de-
fendants contested the amendment as to disfigurement, contending that
it caught them by surprise, thereby prejudicially depriving them of an
opportunity to properly meet the matter. The supreme court found no
abuse of discretion since "[t]he allegations of the complaint with re-
spect to damages were very broad and . . . might properly be con-
strued as embracing recovery for disfigurement." z The court further
stated:
[A]t the most, the effect of the amendment was to include an
additional element of damage resulting from the wrongful acts
originally set forth in the complaint. The medical testimony upon
which plaintiff relied was introduced in evidence through deposi-
tions taken before trial, at which counsel representing defendants
cross examined the doctors. This medical testimony constituted a
full disclosure of the physical condition of Mrs. Anders, and we
find no basis upon which to hold that the amendment operated as
a surprise or resulted in legal prejudice to defendants.?
B. Computation of Compensatory Damages
Harris v. Marion Concrete Co.,2 concerned personal injury ac-
tions arising out of an automobile collision. In its opinion the United
States District Court presented a concise summary of the elements of
compensatory damages:
Under the law of South Carolina one who negligently injures an-
other party is liable for compensatory damages in proportion to
the character and extent of the injury. In determining the amount
of compensation for personal injuries, it is proper to consider the
physical and mental pain and suffering endured, the expense in-
curred for necessary medical treatment, the loss of time and in-
come which results, the impairment of ability to work and earn a
permanently partially disabled in the use of her right arm and have affected
her normal and customary ability to walk and maneuver. This has caused
and will cause a substantial loss of employment, wages and other income.
The plaintiff has suffered and will suffer greatly from these injuries
(emphasis added).
22. 180 S.E.2d at 880.
23. Id.
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livelihood, and the character of the injury, and the amount that
would make the injured party whole as respects permanent inju-
ries.2
C. Allegations of Damages as Evidence
In McGowan v. Gillenwater,26 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reaffirmed its position on the presentation of pleadings to the
jury:Y
We find the district judge did not abuse his discretion in barring
from the jury the amount of damages alleged in the complaint.
This was no part of the proof, and it had no role to play in the
jury's consideration of the case. . . . The function of the plead-
ings is to notify court and counsel of the bare bones of the con-
troversy, and rarely do they have any evidentiary value.2
EARL D. HEWLETTE, JR.
25. Id. at 20.
26. 429 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1970).
27. Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1959); accord, Craven v. Associated
Transport, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 8 (D.S.C. 1966).
28. 429 F.2d at 586.
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